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On September 21, 2016  51-year-old Sûreté du Québec Constable  Jacques Ostigny 
suffered a fatal heart attack while attempting  to locate two hikers who had 
reported encountering a bear in a wooded area in Saguenay Fjord National Park.
The area was unpassable  by vehicle, requiring  Constable 
Ostigney to hike into the woods in an attempt to locate the 
hikers. During the search he became ill and collapsed.
He was flown to a local hospital where he passed away.
Constable Ostigny had served with the agency for 24 years.
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Source: Officer Down Memorial Page available at www.odmp.org/canada
‘GOOD	SAMARITAN	DRUG	
OVERDOSE	ACT’	PROPOSED
On February  22, 2016 Bill C-224, the “Good 
Samaritan  Drug Overdose Act”, was introduced into 
Parliament and received first reading. This act 
proposes to amend the Controlled Drugs and 
Substances Act (CDSA)  by exempting  people in 
possession of drugs from criminal charges if they 
seek emergency medical or law enforcement 
assistance for themselves or another person 
following  an overdose on a controlled substance. 
On June 3, 2016 the Bill received second reading 
and was referred to  Committee, which reported the 
Bill without amendment in the House of Commons.
This Act would add a definition for “overdose” and 
amend s. 4 of the CDSA, which addresses what is 
more commonly known as simple possession of a 
controlled substance, by adding  the following 
provisions:
Definition of overdose
s. 4.1(1) For the purposes of this section, overdose
means a physiological event induced by the 
introduction of a controlled substance  into the 
body of a  person that results in a life-threatening 
situation and that a  reasonable person would 
believe requires emergency medical or law 
enforcement assistance.
Exemption from possession of substance charges
s. 4.1(2) No one who seeks emergency medical or
law enforcement assistance because they, or 
another person, are suffering from  an  overdose is to 
be charged under subsection 4(1) if the evidence 
in  support of that offence was obtained or 
discovered as a result of that person  having sought 
assistance and having remained at the scene.
Precision
s. 4.1(3) The exemption under subsection  (2)
applies to any person  who is at the  scene upon the 
arrival of the emergency medical or law 
enforcement assistance.
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Upcoming Courses
Advanced	Police	Training
Advanced training provides opportunities for skill 
development and career enhancement for police 
officers. Training  is offered in the areas of 
investigation, patrol operations and leadership for 
in-service municipal and RCMP police officers.
JIBC	Police	Academy
See Course List here.
Graduate Certificates
Intelligence Analysis
or 
Tactical Criminal Analysis
www.jibc.ca
NEW JIBC Graduate 
Certificate in Public 
Safety Leadership
see 
pages  
31-32
November	2,	2016
Justice Institute of BC
715 McBride Blvd.
New Westminster, BC
See pages 
16-17
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WHAT’S	NEW	FOR	POLICE	IN	
THE	LIBRARY
The Justice Institute of British Columbia Library is an 
excellent resource for learning. Here is a list of its 
recent acquisitions which may be of interest to 
police. 
Coaching basics.
Lisa Haneberg.
Alexandria, VA : ATD Press, 2016.
HF 5549.5 C53 H263 2016
The cost of emotions in the workplace: bottom 
line value of emotional continuity management.
Vali Hawkins Mitchell; Kristen Noakes-Fry, editor.
Brookfield, CT: Rothstein Associates, 2013.
HF 5548.8 H39 2013
Doing  the right things right:  how the effective 
executive spends time.
Laura Stack.
Oakland, CA: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, [2016]
HD 38.2 S73 2016
The ethical warrior: values, morals & ethics for 
life, work and service .
Jack E. Hoban.
Spring Lake, NJ: RGI Media and Publications, 2012.
HV 7419 H63 2012
Evaluation basics.
Donald V. McCain.
Alexandria, VA: ATD Press, 2016.
HF 5549.5 T7 M334 2016
Facilitation basics.
Donald V. McCain.
Alexandria, VA: ATD Press, 2015.
HF 5549.5 T7 M333 2015
Integral conflict: the new science of conflict.
Richard J. McGuigan & Nancy Popp; foreword by 
Ken Wilber and Vern Neufeld Redekop.
Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 
2015.
HM 1126 M396 2015
A knock on the door: the essential history of 
residential schools from the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission of Canada.
foreword by Phil Fontaine.
Winnipeg, MB: University of Manitoba Press: 
National Centre for Truth and Reconciliation, 
University of Manitoba, 2016.
E 96.5 K56 2016
The literature review: six steps to success.
Lawrence A. Machi & Brenda  T. McEvoy.
Thousand Oaks, CA: Corwin, 2016.
LB 1047.3 M33 2016
Models of proposal planning & writing.
Jeremy T. Miner & Kelly C. Ball-Stahl.
Santa Barbara, CA: Greenwood, an imprint of ABC-
CLIO, LLC, 2016.
HG 177.5 U6 M558 2016
Performance basics.
Joe Willmore.
Alexandria, VA: ATD Press, 2016.
HF 5549.5 T7 W55 2016
Training design basics.
Saul Carliner
Alexandria, VA: ATD Press, 2015.
HF 5549.5 T7 C275 2015
The trusted executive:  nine leadership habits 
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GENERAL	WARRANT	DID	NOT	
PRECLUDE	POLICE	SEARCH	AS	
AN	INCIDENT	TO	ARREST
R. v. Ly, 2016 ABCA 229
Canada Border Services Agency 
(CBSA) in Montreal identified a 
package to be delivered to a  Calgary 
address by Canada Post that appeared 
to have originated in Peru. The 
package was addressed to “Sammy Davies”. CBSA 
agents suspected that the package contained 
controlled drugs. They opened the package and 
found 961 grams of cocaine wrapped in packets. 
These  packets were inserted in tea bag  packages and 
then inserted in bags of coffee. The package was 
transported from Montreal to Calgary for a 
controlled delivery to the Calgary address. Under the 
authority of a s. 487.01 Criminal Code general 
warrant the police substituted a benign substance in 
place of the cocaine and installed a  triggering  alarm 
within the package.
A second general warrant authorized the police to 
deliver the  package within a two day time period 
and then directed that “once the package was 
delivered, investigators would wait until the 
alarm is tripped signalling  the package has been 
opened or 12 hours has elapsed from the time of 
delivery.” The warrant also stated that the “police 
may overtly enter any vehicle that contains the 
package.” The warrant, however, made no reference 
to cell phones. 
A police officer, posing  as a Canada Post employee, 
delivered the parcel to the address. A man accepted 
the parcel. Later, the accused arrived at the 
residence and was observed by the police as he 
placed the package into his vehicle  and covered it 
with a blanket. He was then arrested and the 
package recovered. He was searched and had a 
Blackberry in his pocket. On the Blackberry phone 
the police found text messages from another co-
accused, referring  to “Sammy David”, and a draft 
message with the tracking  number of the parcel. In 
his vehicle, police found a Huawei cell phone, three 
Western Union money orders payable in US dollars 
to someone in Peru and a lease agreement for the 
vehicle. The cell phones were sent to the 
Technological Crime Unit for a more thorough 
search. The alarm in the package was never triggered 
and the package was seized from the vehicle less 
than 12 hours after delivery. The accused was jointly 
charged with two others with possessing  cocaine for 
the purpose of trafficking and unlawful importation.
 
Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench
   
The accused argued that he was subject 
to an unlawful arrest and unreasonable 
search and seizure and that all of the 
items seized at the time of arrest from him 
and the vehicle he had been driving  should be 
excluded from evidence on the basis that the arrest 
was unlawful and the seizures breached s. 8  of the 
Charter. In his view, the pre-conditions of the 
general warrant were not met prior to his arrest and 
search, and the searches of his cell phones were not 
properly conducted as an incident to arrest.
The judge found the searches of the accused and his 
vehicle (other than the seizure of the controlled 
delivery package)  were searches incidental to arrest. 
The controlled delivery package was seized in 
accordance with the terms of the  general warrant. 
There was no s. 8  Charter breaches arising  from 
these searches and seizures. The judge also held that 
the cursory search of the Blackberry cell phone did 
not fall outside the ambit of the common law 
doctrine of search incidental to arrest, and the 
resulting  data was admitted into evidence. The more 
thorough searches of the cell phones by the 
Technological Crime Unit, however, should have 
been conducted under a warrant and did amount to 
a s. 8  breach. Nevertheless, the evidence was 
admitted under s. 24(2). The accused was convicted 
on both charges and he was sentenced to six years 
in prison.
Alberta Court of Appeal
The accused again argued that 
the pre-conditions of the 
general warrant were not met 
prior to his arrest and the 
seizures, and the searches of his cell phones were 
not proper as an incident to his arrest. He contended 
that the police were required to follow the warrant 
in a linear progression and wait for the disjunctive 
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pre-conditions before exercising  the authorities 
outlined in the anticipatory warrant. Since there was 
no triggering  alarm signalling  that the package was 
opened nor had 12 hours have elapsed since the 
delivery of the package, the accused maintained the 
search by police was unlawful.
Warrant Pre-conditions
The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial judge that 
the provision that the “police may overtly enter any 
vehicle that contains the package” was not 
constrained by a waiting  period and there was no 
temporal condition relative to the authority to enter 
a vehicle that contained the package. 
Search incident to arrest
For a search to be  proper as an incident to arrest, 
“the arrest itself must be lawful, the search must be 
truly incidental to the arrest and the objective of the 
search must be for a valid administration of justice 
purpose. Cellphone searches … may also be 
appropriate as a search incident to arrest subject to 
two additional conditions: the search must be 
tailored to its purpose and the police are  required to 
take detailed notes of what they examined and how 
they examined it.”
As for whether the issuance of the general warrant 
with its specified conditions precluded reliance 
upon the common law power to search incident to 
arrest, the Court of Appeal found it did not.
The general warrant does not address the powers 
of arrest. The factual matrix establishes a strong 
basis upon which the trial judge properly 
concluded that the police had both a subjective 
and objective basis to believe that the [accused] 
was committing an indictable offence. As we see 
it, entry into the vehicle to seize the parcel was 
lawful under both the general warrant and as a 
search incident to arrest. The triggering events, 
on a plain reading  of the terms of the general 
warrant, do not operate as conditions precedent 
to the seizure of the parcel from the vehicle 
(section 4.g. of the general warrant). In addition, 
in our opinion, the police had authority to enter 
the vehicle as a search incident to arrest. The 
factual underpinnings articulated by the trial 
judge, in our opinion, satisfy the common law 
conditions precedent. [para. 17]
As to the cell phone search, the trial judge did not 
have the benefit of the Supreme Court of Canada 
decision in R. v. Fearon, 2014 SCC 77. And, even  if 
the Fearon  criteria for cell phone searches incident 
to arrest were not met, the trial judge made no error 
in  her s. 24(2) analysis in admitting the evidence:
[W]e see no basis upon which to set aside the 
trial judge’s conclusion that the police 
reasonably believed they had the lawful 
authority to conduct the cellphone search, 
including  the forensic data searches. Assuming 
without deciding  that the infringement of the 
Charter protected interests was, nonetheless 
serious, and thereby favoured exclusion of the 
evidence, the trial judge properly concluded on 
the unique facts of this case that the package 
and its contents of contraband constituted real 
ev idence and tha t the ev idence was 
indispensible to prove certain elements of the 
indictable crimes. Deference in the absence of 
factual misapprehension or error in principle 
precludes appellate intervention. [para. 18]
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
“The general warrant does not address the powers of arrest. ...  As we see it, entry into 
the vehicle to seize the parcel was lawful under both the general warrant and as a search 
incident to arrest. ... [I]n our opinion, the police had authority to enter the vehicle as a 
search incident to arrest.”
“Cellphone searches … may also be 
appropriate as a search incident to arrest 
subject to two additional conditions: the 
search must be tailored to its purpose 
and the police are required to take 
detailed notes of what they examined 
Volume 16 Issue 5 - September/October 2016
PAGE 6
COURT	MUST	CONSIDER	
TOTALITY	OF	EVIDENCE	IN	
ASSESSING	RELIABILITY	OF	TIP
R. v. Merelles, 2016 ONCA 647
Police received information from a 
confidential informer that the accused 
was dealing  in large amounts of 
heroin. The informer provided 
information about the  accused, 
including  his personal attributes, the  location of 
properties frequented by him, a description of his 
truck and licence plate, and the kind of heroin in his 
possession. During  three days of surveillance, police 
noted four apparent hand-to-hand drug  transactions 
between the accused and unknown individuals, one 
of which occurred at his Delaware Ave. residence. 
The accused also appeared to engage in counter-
surveillance driving techniques.
The police obtained search warrants for three 
properties, including  his residence on Delaware Ave. 
and the garage of his girlfriend’s mother’s home on 
Columbine Ave. They seized 189.19 grams of 
cocaine from the  Columbine property; 983.51 grams 
of heroin, 29.36 grams of cocaine, $19,850 in 
Canadian currency and $150 in US currency from 
the accused’s Delaware residence; and 6.41 grams 
of heroin, including  20 decks of 0.15 grams each, 
and 1.88 grams of cocaine, on the accused’s person.
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
The judge found the accused lacked 
standing  to challenge the search 
warrants for his girlfriend’s mother’s 
property because he did not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in it. There was no 
evidence he had an ownership, leasehold or 
possessory interest. He only had a key to the garage 
and stored machinery and tools there with consent. 
As for the the accused’s residence, the judge 
accepted that the accused had a  reasonable 
expectation of privacy in it since it was his home. 
The warrant, however, was valid. The information 
from the confidential informer and police 
surveillance provided reasonable grounds to believe 
that drugs and related property would be located 
there. The confidential informer’s information was 
highly detailed and compelling. As well, the 
apparent hand-to-hand transactions were consistent 
with the  confidential informer’s information that the 
accused was trading  in illicit drugs. He was 
convicted of possessing  heroin for the purpose  of 
trafficking, possessing  cocaine for the purpose of 
trafficking  and possessing  proceeds of crime. He was 
sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment, less time 
served.
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused argued that the 
trial judge erred in concluding 
that he did not have standing  to 
challenge the search of the his 
girlfriend’s mother’s property and in finding  that the 
search warrant for his residence was valid.
Privacy Interest
Section 8  of the Charter  protects a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, to be established by the 
claimant, based on the totality  of the circumstances. 
Factors to consider in assessing  whether a claimant 
has a reasonable expectation of privacy include:
• presence at the time of the search;
• possession or control of the property or place 
searched;
• ownership of the property or place searched;
• historical use of the property or item;
• the ability to regulate  access, including  the right 
to admit or exclude others from the place;
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• the existence of a subjective expectation of 
privacy; and
• the objective reasonableness of the expectation.
 
Here, the accused did not testify. His girlfriend lived 
at the residence with her mother; he only had a key 
to the garage, not the rest of the house, and was 
permitted to store tools and machinery there. In 
upholding  the trial judge’s conclusion that the 
accused did not have standing  to challenge the 
search warrant for his girlfriend’s mother’s property, 
Justice Pepall stated:
In my view, the trial judge did not err in 
concluding that the [accused] had no standing 
with respect to the Columbine property. While 
the [accused] had a key, there was no evidence 
that the [accused] regulated access to the 
garage. Nor was there any evidence of historical 
use of the property – only that he used it in 
September 2010. The [accused] was not present 
at the time of the search and he did not possess, 
control or own the garage. Although one could 
infer that he could admit people to the garage, 
there was no evidence to suggest that he could 
exclude entry.  There was no evidence about 
others in possession of a key. There was also no 
evidence of any subjective expectation of 
privacy or evidence supporting an inference of a 
subjective expectation of privacy. [The accused] 
was “no more than a privileged guest”.
I also reject the [accused’s] argument that a 
garage in these circumstances is akin to a rental 
locker. There was no evidence that the [accused] 
rented the garage space or that he had exclusive 
access to it. From the evidence before the trial 
judge, the [accused] was simply permitted to use 
the garage to store tools. The totality of the 
circumstances did not give rise to a reasonable 
expectation of privacy. [para. 21-22]
Search Warrant
When a court reviews the sufficiency of a search 
warrant, which is presumed valid, the  test is 
“whether there was reliable evidence that might 
reasonably be believed on the basis of which the 
authorization could have issued.”  Here, the Court of 
Appeal found there was ample evidence  for the trial 
judge to conclude that there were reasonable and 
probable grounds for its issuance with respect to the 
accuse’s residence. In regards to informer 
information, the Justice Pepall stated:
Evidence of a tip from an informant by itself is 
insufficient. When assessing the reliability of a 
tip from a confidential informant, the court is to 
consider the totality of the circumstances. The 
court must look to a variety of factors including: 
(1) the degree of detail of the tip (including the 
time, place, participants involved, and nature of 
the alleged activity); (2) the informant’s source of 
knowledge (whether it is first-hand or obtained 
from others); and (3) indicia of the informant’s 
reliability such as past performance or 
confirmation from other investigative sources. 
[para. 26]
In this case, although the confidential informer had 
only  provided information on one previous occasion 
that resulted in charges as opposed to a conviction, 
the information provided by the informer was 
detailed and first-hand. And there was no 
information given in the past to the police that 
turned out to be unreliable. In addition, “the police 
investigation and surveillance established a strong 
link between the [accused] and the Delaware 
residence and included the  observation of an 
apparent hand-to-hand transaction in the residence’s 
well-lit garage,” said Justice Pepall. “The [accused] 
“Evidence of a tip from an informant by itself is insufficient. When assessing the reliability 
of a tip from a confidential informant, the court is to consider the totality of the 
circumstances. The court must look to a variety of factors including: (1) the degree of 
detail of the tip (including the time, place, participants involved, and nature of the alleged 
activity); (2) the informant’s source of knowledge (whether it is first-hand or obtained 
from others); and (3) indicia of the informant’s reliability such as past performance or 
confirmation from other investigative sources.”
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then was observed to have left the premises and to 
have participated in another apparent hand-to-hand 
transaction. The police surveillance observations 
amplified, and were consistent with, the rest of the 
information provided by the informant.”
Since the search was lawful, there was no need to 
consider s. 24(2)  of the Charter. The accused’s 
appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
POLICE	HAD	DUTY	TO	ENTER	
PREMISE	TO	CHECK	SAFETY
R. v. Lowes, 2016 ONCA 519
 
A person called 911 reporting  that she 
heard her neighbours arguing. She 
heard a man threaten to kill a woman. 
The woman was crying  and pleading, 
"Please don't kill me." Loud banging 
and crashing  was also heard. Police arrived at the 
apartment within minutes. Police confirmed with the 
neighbor the location of the apparent assault and 
knocked on the door but there  was no answer. 
Eventually, a woman came to the window on the 
third floor. A police  officer explained why the police 
were on scene. The woman said she was in bed, told 
the officer to leave, refused to open the door and 
insisted there was no one else in the apartment. It 
was obvious to the police, however, that the woman 
was speaking  to someone who was standing  behind 
her.
 
The police, concerned that the woman and/or others 
were in immediate  danger, decided to seek their 
supervisor’s permission to break down the door and 
enter the residence. However, before they had a 
chance to force entry, the woman appeared at the 
door. She had no visible injuries, stepped outside 
and spoke to the police. She did not want the police 
inside her residence and there were no sounds 
coming  from within. Concerned for the woman’s 
safety and that of any other unknown person who 
might be in the residence with the person who had 
been heard uttering  the death threats, the police 
forced their way inside the residence.  Once inside, 
police observed marijuana and other drugs and 
found the accused hiding  under a cover under the 
bed. Continuing  to search for anyone else  who might 
be in the residence, the police found more 
contraband. The accused was removed from the 
residence, the apartment was “sealed” and a  warrant 
was sought, granted and executed. The drugs were 
seized and the accused was charged with drug 
offences.
 
Ontario Court of Justice
 
The police testified they were concerned 
about the woman’s safety or that of other 
people based on the contents of the 
reported 911 call, the  obvious lies told by 
the woman about the presence of anyone else in the 
house, and the woman’s demeanour when she  spoke 
to them from the window and at the door. The judge 
recognized that the police could enter a residence 
without a warrant if they had reasonable  grounds to 
believe that entry was necessary to protect the lives 
and safety of others. However, he held that the 
police could not enter the residence without taking 
additional investigative steps. They could have 
quest ioned the woman fur ther about the 
circumstances of what went on in the apartment, 
questioned the neighbour who made the 911 call or 
applied for a telewarrant. The judge found the police 
entry  unlawful and the  resultant search and seizure 
of the  contraband a s. 8 Charter breach. The 
evidence was excluded under s. 24(2) and the 
accused was acquitted.
 
Ontario Court of Appeal
 
A C r o w n a p p e a l w a s 
successful. In the Court of 
Appeal’s view, the police 
lawfully entered the apartment:
 
[N]one of [the additional investigative steps 
identified by the trial judge] were necessary or, 
indeed, even relevant to whether the police were 
under a duty to enter the premises when they 
did to ensure that there was no one in the 
premises whose life or safety was in immediate 
danger and to ensure that [the woman’s] life or 
safety was not in immediate danger should she 
choose to re-enter the residence.
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The circumstances in which the police found 
themselves strongly suggested that [the woman] 
was the victim of ongoing domestic abuse when 
they arrived at the residence. She clearly lied to 
the police when they first spoke to her. In these 
circumstances, the police would have been 
derelict in their duty had they accepted what 
[the woman] said without going into the 
residence.
 
Any further discussion with the neighbour would 
not in any way have detracted from the 
emergency situation faced by the police. 
Nothing the neighbour could possibly have said 
would have eliminated the immediate risk to the 
lives and safety of others, including [the 
woman]. Finally, the delay inherent in obtaining 
a telewarrant, assuming the police could get 
one, created obvious and significant risks that in 
these circumstances the police could not, in 
good conscience, take. [paras. 11-13]
 
The accused’s acquittals were quashed and a new 
trial was ordered with the Appeal Court noting  that 
the issue of whether the scope of any search 
conducted by the police  after they entered the 
premises went beyond the boundaries of s. 8  may be 
analyzed at the new trial.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
‘AS	SOON	AS	PRACTICABLE’	
MEANS	WITHIN	A	REASONABLY	
PROMPT	TIME,	NOT	AS	SOON	AS	
POSSIBLE
R. v. Prestupa, 2016 SKCA 118
A police officer saw the accused 
remain at a  stop sign for several 
minutes, although there was no other 
traffic in the area. He then turned onto 
a highway and accelerated to 160 km/
h. The officer pulled the accused over at 12:10 am. 
The officer smelled alcohol on the accused’s breath 
and noticed that his eyes were glossy and bloodshot. 
An approved screening  device demand was made 
and a roadside breath test was administered. The 
accused failed. He was arrested for impaired driving 
and was given his rights and warnings.
 
The officer planned to tow the accused’s vehicle, but 
agreed to allow his parents come and pick it up. 
While waiting  for the parents to attend, the officer 
called his home detachment to ensure that the on-
call breath technician would be ready to take breath 
samples when they arrived. The parents arrived 
about 20 to 25 minutes later and took the truck. The 
officer left the scene at about 12:57 am and drove 
the 80 kms to the detachment, arriving  at 1:30 am.  
After the right to counsel was addressed, the first 
breath sample was taken at 1:45 am (190 mg% ) and 
a second sample some 20 minutes later (180 mg%).
 
Saskatchewan Provincial Court
 
The officer testified that he took the 
accused to his home detachment because 
it was his home base and he knew that a 
qualified breath technician was on call. 
He said he  was aware that there was another 
detachment only about 40 to 50 kms away from the 
scene, but he did not know whether that detachment 
would have been able to facilitate breath testing. He 
was also aware there were other detachments in the 
area but did not know how far away they were from 
the scene. The accused testified there was one 
detachment some 55 km away and another 75 km 
away. However, there was no evidence those 
detachments were equipped with an operational 
“[N]one of [the additional investigative 
steps identified by the trial judge] were 
necessary or, indeed, even relevant to 
whether the police were under a duty to 
enter the premises when they did to 
ensure that there was no one in the 
premises whose life or safety was in 
immediate danger and to ensure that 
[the woman’s] life or safety was not in 
immediate danger should she choose to 
re-enter the residence.”
Note-able Quote
“The person who never made a mistake never tried 
anything new.” - Albert Einstein
Volume 16 Issue 5 - September/October 2016
PAGE 10
breath testing  instrument on the night of the stop  nor 
any evidence they were staffed with a police officer 
or qualified breath technician.
 
The judge concluded that the Crown failed to 
discharge its burden in proving  beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the breath samples were taken as soon as 
practicable. Thus, the Crown could not rely on the 
evidentiary presumption of identity found in s. 
258(1)(c) of the Criminal Code, which deems the 
results of the breath tests to be proof of the accused’s 
blood alcohol level at the time of the offence, absent 
evidence to the contrary. Since one  detachment was 
35 kilometers closer than the officer’s home 
detachment and another 25 kilometers closer, breath 
samples could have been taken sooner at those 
locations. “I find that the Crown has not 
demonstrated that the police officer acted 
reasonably in the circumstances of this case because 
the police officer did not inquire if there was a 
machine or breath technician available at a closer 
detachment where  there was nothing  preventing  him 
from doing  so,” said the judge. “He had ample time 
to make such inquiries while they waited for the 
accused’s parents to come pick up his vehicle and 
the time of the first breath test was pushing  toward 
the two hour limit.” Since  the Crown could not rely 
on the presumption, there was no evidence of the 
accused’s blood alcohol concentration at the time of 
driving  and he was acquitted of driving  over 80mg
%.
 
Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench
 
A Crown appeal of the accused’s 
acquittal was successful. The appeal 
judge ruled that the trial judge had erred 
with respect to the interpretation and 
application of the “as soon as practicable” 
requirement set out in s. 258(1)(c)  because he 
equated the test for “as soon as practicable” with “as 
soon as possible”. “The phrase ‘as soon as 
practicable’ means nothing  more than that the 
breath samples be taken within a reasonably prompt 
time under the circumstances,” said the appeal 
judge. “I find that under the circumstances of this 
case  the constable did not offend the applicable 
provision of the Criminal Code when he decided to 
go to his home detachment where he knew a 
breathalyzer technician was waiting  to conduct the 
tests. Quite  frankly this was just simply  common 
sense.” The certificate of analysis was admissible, the 
accused’s acquittal was set aside and a conviction 
for over 80mg% was entered. The matter was 
remitted to the trial judge for sentencing.
 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal
 
The accused appealed his 
conviction arguing  that his 
acquittal should not have been 
set aside. He submitted, among 
other things, that the  trial judge substituted his own 
view of the facts as to whether the breath samples 
had been taken as soon as practicable, something  he 
was not entitled to do. The Court of Appeal, 
however, disagreed. There was no dispute  about the 
facts. Instead, this was a  question of law—did   the 
trial judge apply a more onerous “as soon as 
possible” standard?
 
Justice Ottenbreit, speaking  for the Court of Appeal, 
concluded that the trial judge did make an error of 
law and that the appeal judge correctly  found the 
actions of the police officer complied  with s. 258(1)
(c):
 
“The legal meaning of the phrase ‘as soon as practicable’ is well established ... It simply 
means the breath samples must be taken within a reasonably prompt time in the 
circumstances. In other words, the Crown does not need to prove that breath samples 
were taken as soon as possible to satisfy the “as soon as practicable” requirement. The 
upshot of this is that, depending on the circumstances, breath tests can be taken as soon 
as practicable, even if they could have been taken sooner. The legal test is flexible and 
grounded in common sense.”
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The legal meaning  of the phrase “as soon as 
practicable” is well established ... . Therefore, I 
need not explain it in detail. It simply means the 
breath samples must be taken within a 
reasonably prompt time in the circumstances. In 
other words, the Crown does not need to prove 
that breath samples were taken as soon as 
possible to satisfy the “as soon as practicable” 
requirement. The upshot of this is that, 
depending  on the circumstances, breath tests 
can be taken as soon as practicable, even if they 
could have been taken sooner. The legal test is 
flexible and grounded in common sense. 
[references omitted, para. 16]
In this case, the trial judge improperly focussed on 
whether the breath samples could have been taken 
sooner even though there was no evidence that a 
breath instrument was accessible or calibrated at the 
closer detachments:  
 
The trial judge’s view of this evidence and what 
was reasonable was coloured by her focus on 
whether the breath samples could have been 
taken sooner. This is clear from her statement 
“All things being  equal the breath samples could 
have been taken sooner in Lanigan or Watrous.” 
Although she had no evidence before her that a 
breath machine was accessible or calibrated at 
closer detachments, the mere existence of those 
closer detachments was crucial to her approach 
and findings. In the absence of such evidence, it 
is a fair inference that time became the 
paramount factor in her analysis. This resulted in 
an “as soon as possible” approach to viewing 
the reasonableness of the constable’s actions.
 
The trial judge erred by requiring the constable 
to inquire outside of his detachment area 
whether a breath machine was accessible and 
calibrated on the basis that there was a 
possibility that the tests might have been taken 
sooner. She assumed that all things were “equal” 
apart from distances. This is in contrast to the 
constable’s reliance on a machine at his own 
detachment and a technician he knew was 
available. Even assuming that the constable had 
been able to locate another machine and 
technician closer to Viscount than Saskatoon, it 
would have saved only a small amount of time 
assuming he could have travelled as fast to that 
location. Evidence of the possibility of breath 
machines or technicians closer than the one 
chosen by an officer or the failure of an officer to 
inquire about that possibility, without more, is 
not determinative that the breath tests were not 
done as soon as practicable. The test, “as soon as 
practicable,” is not honed to such a fine point. 
The test is grounded in common sense. [paras. 
18-19]
 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed and his 
conviction was upheld.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
CHILD	PROTECTION	
INTERVENTION	DID	NOT	SAVE	
CRIMINAL	INVESTIGATION
R. v. Noftall, 2016 NLCA 48
A social worker with Newfoundland’s 
Department of Child, Youth and 
Family  Services received a call 
reporting  that a one-year-old child 
may be in need of protective 
intervention.  The caller reported that “there was 
information in the community” that the accused and 
his partner, the child’s mother, had a  grow-op  in 
their home and were selling  drugs.  The social 
worker knew the  caller but did not know either the 
accused or his partner, the child’s mother. The social 
worker contacted the police and requested that a 
police officer accompany her and another social 
worker for the investigation.  
When the officer along  with the social workers 
arrived at and entered the home, a strong  odour of 
growing  marihuana was detected. The social worker 
told the  child’s mother that she believed she smelled 
marihuana. The child’s mother denied that there was 
marihuana in the house, but suggested the smell 
might come from the accused’s clothes since he 
occasionally smoked marihuana.   The social worker 
told the child’s mother that she was investigating  a 
report that there was a grow-op in the house from 
which drugs were sold. When the social worker 
asked if they could look around the house, the 
accused asked if they had a warrant. The social 
worker, as did the police officer, said they did not 
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have a warrant nor did they need one when 
investigating a child protection referral. 
The accused showed the second social worker and 
the police officer to the bedroom. In the  closet were 
six tubs with marihuana plants growing. There  was a 
heat lamp, temperature gauges, fans and a stainless 
steel hood-refractor. A rifle with a loaded magazine 
was found nearby. The police officer arrested the 
accused for producing  marihuana and possessing 
the unsecured firearm. He was removed from the 
house and a search warrant was obtained. 
Marihuana, related paraphernalia, the rifle  and 
loaded magazine were seized.  The child’s mother 
removed the child from the house  and the accused 
was subsequently charged with unlawfully 
producing marihuana.
Newfoundland Supreme Court
The judge accepted the officer’s testimony 
that he went with the social workers not 
because  of the drug  allegations, but to 
ensure  the safety of the social workers as 
they investigated the referral that there was a child in 
the house who might be at risk of harm.  In the 
judge’s view, the police officer lawfully entered the 
accused’s house with the social workers as they 
completed their investigation. Then, once the 
growing  marihuana had been found, the officer 
withdrew from the property  to obtain a search 
warrant before going  any further with his criminal 
investigation of the marihuana grow-operation. The 
judge found no s. 8  Charter breaches and, even if 
there  was one, the evidence was admissible under s. 
24(2). The accused was convicted of producing 
marihuana.
Newfoundland Court of Appeal
The accused argued that his 
rights under s. 8  of the Charter 
had been breached. The Court 
of Appeal agreed. In its view, 
the police officer required a  search warrant to locate 
the marihuana plants. Justice Welsh, speaking  for the 
Court of Appeal, stated:
The information in the report to the Department 
together with the smell of growing marihuana 
provided sufficient grounds for the police officer 
to suspect the commission of an offence under 
the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.  
However, he was in [the accused’s] residence, 
which engages a high expectation of privacy 
under section 8  of the Charter.   The marihuana 
plants and firearm were not in plain view from 
where the officer stood. 
When he smelled the marihuana, the officer had 
two separate mandates, that is, securing  the 
safety of the social workers, and investigating  a 
possible offence. He could not use the former to 
clothe the latter with authority that would 
otherwise result in a breach of [the accused’s] 
rights under section 8 of the Charter. In order to 
avoid this conundrum, the officer could have 
taken the following approach. When he smelled 
the marihuana which he identified as “growing”, 
he could, as he did, have given this information 
to [the accused], the child’s mother and the 
social workers.  At that point, he could have 
proceeded in a manner that would have been 
consistent with both his mandates by asking all 
present to remain in the kitchen while he took 
action to obtain a search warrant.  A warrant, 
which may be requested by telephone, would 
have provided authorization for a search under 
the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act 
consistent with [the accused’s] rights under 
section 8 of the Charter.
I would note in passing  that [the accused’s] 
conduct could not be construed as informed 
consent to the search for purposes of grounding 
a charge under the Controlled Drugs and 
Substances Act.  He conducted a social worker 
and the officer to the location of the marihuana 
plants in reliance on the social worker’s 
“When he smelled the marihuana, the 
officer had two separate mandates, that is, 
securing the safety of the social workers, 
and investigating a possible offence. He 
could not use the former to clothe the 
latter with authority that would otherwise 
result in a breach of [the accused’s] rights 
under section 8 of the Charter.”
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representation that a search warrant was not 
required. 
I would note further that a request by the officer 
that [the accused] remain in the kitchen with 
him would constitute an investigative detention, 
engaging the relevant law.  It is unnecessary to 
consider the issue in this case since that was not 
the approach taken by the officer.
In the circumstances, the police officer’s failure 
to obtain a warrant prior to a search for the 
location of the marihuana plants resulted in a 
breach of [the accused’s] rights under section 8 
of the Charter for purposes of investigating an 
offence and laying  a charge under the 
Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.   The trial 
judge erred in concluding  that the officer’s 
involvement in the social worker’s investigation 
under the Act allowed him to search [the 
accused’s] residence and to lay a charge when 
he was led to the location of the plants which, 
together with the firearm, were then in plain 
view. [paras. 33-37]
s. 24(2) Admissibility
The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial judge that 
the evidence was nonetheless admissible. The 
conduct of the police fell at the  lower end of the 
continuum of seriousness, the impact on the 
accused’s Charter protected interests was not 
significant and the evidence was important to 
proving  a serious offence in which society had a 
significant interest in having  adjudicated on its 
merits. 
The evidence of the  grow-op was admissible, the 
accused’s appeal was dismissed and his conviction 
was upheld. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
ARREST	LAWFUL:	OFFICER	MET	
REQUISITE	SUBJECTIVE	&	
OBJECTIVE	STANDARDS
R. v. Rowson, 2016 SCC 40
The accused proceeded into an 
intersection from a secondary  road 
and struck the passenger side of a 
vehicle travelling  on a major highway. 
Three passengers in the other vehicle 
were seriously injured. Police arrived on scene at 
9:07 pm. The accused said he had stopped at the 
stop  sign but thought he had time to make it. He 
claimed he had not been drinking  and did not need 
any medical attention. At 9:18  pm a police officer 
placed him in the  back seat of her police car and 
closed the door. She wanted to make sure  the 
accused was safe. The scene was chaotic and there 
was an air ambulance arriving. At 9:23  a second 
officer at scene saw the accused speaking  on his cell 
phone. He told the accused to hang  up  the phone 
and advised him that he was under investigative 
detention “in relation to the accident,” but did not 
tell him about his right to counsel. 
At 9:20 pm, a third officer spoke with the accused in 
the back of the police vehicle and noticed the smell 
of fresh chewing  gum. He told the accused to spit 
out his gum and blow air in his direction. The 
accused made a “fake  blow,” puffing  up his cheeks 
but not exhaling  any air. At 9:37 pm the officer 
returned to the police vehicle and saw the accused 
using  his cell phone again, claiming  he was texting  a 
friend. At this point, the accused was arrested for 
dangerous driving  and “possibly impaired driving” 
and his cell phone was seized. The officer included 
“possibly impaired driving” because he wanted the 
accused to know that he was still investigating  him 
for it. The accused was advised of his right to 
counsel, searched and placed in the back of another 
police vehicle. The accused said he wanted to 
contact counsel, but the officer told him that he 
could not contact a lawyer at that time due to 
privacy concerns. 
At 9:50 pm a fourth officer opened the police car 
door, asked a few questions but could not smell any 
alcohol. At 10:13  pm the accused was transported to 
“I would note further that a request by 
the officer that [the accused] remain in 
the kitchen with him would constitute an 
investigative detention, engaging the 
relevant law.”
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the police station where he  was re-cautioned and 
asked if he  understood. When he said “Yes, sir”, the 
officer smelled alcohol on the accused’s breath. 
After the  accused spoke to legal aid, a roadside 
screening  demand was made and the accused failed. 
The breath demand followed as did an unsuccessful 
attempt to contact a lawyer. The accused provided 
breath samples resulting  in readings of 110 mg% 
and 100 mg%. He was subsequently  charged with 
impaired driving  and dangerous driving  causing 
bodily harm and over 80 mg%.
Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench
The accused argued many Charter 
breaches including  that there was an 
unlawful arrest by the third officer 
without sufficient cause to do so. The 
judge did find some Charter breaches, including  an 
arbitrary  detention under s. 9 when the first officer 
placed him in the back seat of the locked police car 
and failed to advise him of anything  other than to 
stay put. However, the arrest was ruled lawful. “The 
evidence on a whole supports the fact that [the third 
officer] had reasonable and probable grounds to 
arrest [the accused] for dangerous driving,” said the 
judge, relying on the following eight factors:
1. The officer had been called to what was 
described as an injury collision and had been 
advised that the injuries were serious;
2. The roads were dry and it was a clear night;
3. The officer was advised that a  black truck had 
gone through a stop  sign and collided with a 
white car also in the ditch;
4. The location of the driver of the black truck was 
identified to the officer and he  later identified 
that person as the accused;
5. It was 21:00 at night;
6. Highway 22X is a very busy roadway;
7. The speed limit was quite high in that area; and
8. A normal person would expect traffic to be on 
that highway at that time of night.
Despite the other Charter violations, the breath 
results were  admitted under s. 24(2) and the accused 
was convicted of impaired and dangerous driving 
causing bodily harm.  
Alberta Court of Appeal
The accused argued, among 
other things, that the trial judge 
made an error in not finding  the 
arrest arbitrary. In his view, once 
the trial judge found he had been arbitrary detained 
when placed in the back of the police car, the later 
investigative detention by the second officer and the 
arrest by the third officer were not lawful. 
 
Continuous Detention
Justice O’Ferrall concluded that the judge 
did not err in failing  to find one 
continuous arbitrary detention through to 
the arrest following  the initial s. 9 
breach. As for the legality of the accused’s arrest, he 
found it lawful:
Within 20 minutes of [the second officer] 
informing  the [accused] that he was under 
investigative detention, [the third officer] placed 
the [accused] under arrest. [The arresting officer] 
seized the [accused’s] cellphone, placed him in 
the back seat of his police vehicle, told him he 
was being arrested for dangerous driving  and 
possibly impaired driving and advised him of his 
right to counsel.
The [accused] argues that the trial judge erred in 
finding that the police had grounds to arrest the 
[him]. The Crown, in its factum, listed eight 
pieces of information which [the arresting 
officer] attested formed the basis for his belief 
that the [accused] may have committed the 
indictable offence of dangerous driving. In short, 
the circumstances of the accident and the road 
conditions were such that it was both 
subjectively and objectively reasonable to 
believe that the [accused] might have committed 
the offence of dangerous driving. … [paras. 
25-26]
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Justice O’Ferrall upheld the admission of the 
breathalyzer tests under s. 24(2)  and the accused’s 
appeal was dismissed. 
A Second Opinion
Justice Martin, writing  his own decision, 
also dismissed the appeal on the s. 24(2) 
basis, but commented on the lawfulness 
of the arrest:
I wish to add that I do not agree with the 
[accused] that there were no grounds to detain 
or arrest him at the scene of the accident. The 
[accused] was the driver of a half-ton truck that 
attempted to cross a major, much travelled, four-
lane highway from a secondary road. That 
evening  the roads were dry and clear, visibility 
was unimpeded and all oncoming traffic was 
travelling with headlights on. The posted speed 
limit on the major highway was 90 km/hour, and 
it appears traffic was travelling  at approximately 
that speed. The [accused] advised that he 
stopped before attempting  to cross the highway 
as required by the stop sign facing him. He told 
the first responding  police officers that he 
proceeded because, "I thought I had time to 
make it.”
A Third View
Justice Veldhuis took a different view than 
her colleagues on the legality of the 
accused’s arrest. She found there were no 
grounds to arrest him for dangerous 
driving. The grounds accepted by the trial judge 
were mostly  neutral and could not ground an arrest 
for dangerous driving. “The fact that the accident 
was serious did not give the officer any information 
about whether the driving  that caused it was 
criminal, nor did the location of the driver of the 
truck, the time of day, the speed limit at that portion 
of the roadway or the fact that 22X is a busy 
roadway,” she said. Since the accused’s arrest was 
unlawful, it was arbitrary  and was never cured. This 
significantly impacted the trial judge’s s. 24(2) 
analysis. Justice Veldhuis would have allowed the 
appeal, excluded the breath tests, set aside the 
convictions and acquitted the accused. 
Supreme Court of Canada
The accused appealed his 
c o n v i c t i o n t o t h e 
Supreme Court of Canada 
again arguing  that the 
arresting  officer did not have the requisite 
reasonable grounds for the  arrest. In his view, the 
officer did not have the necessary subjective belief 
for a lawful arrest nor were his grounds objectively 
justified. 
In a very short oral judgment, a three member 
majority of the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed 
the accused’s appeal, substantially for the reasons of 
Justice O’Ferrall of the Alberta Court of Appeal.
A View of Two
Justices Abella and Côté would have 
allowed “the appeal primarily on 
the basis that the  cumulative effect 
of the multiple breaches warranted 
the exclusion of the breathalyzer evidence.”
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.ca
Editor’s note: Facts taken from R. v. Rowson, 2015 
ABCA 354.
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CLOSING	ARGUMENTS	ARE	NOT	
EVIDENCE:	LAWFUL	EXCUSE	NOT	
MADE	OUT
R. v. Dilk, 2016 MBCA 98                     
The complainant, who was in a 
common-law relationship  with the 
accused, obtained a prevention order 
under Manitoba’s Domestic Violence 
and Stalking Act prohibiting  the 
accused from entering  the complainant’s residence 
and from having  any contact or communication with 
her except to discuss major decisions affecting  their 
sons or to make arrangements for access. The terms 
of the prevention order stated:
• [The accused] is enjoined and restrained from 
entering upon any premises where [the 
complainant] may be living separate and apart 
from [the accused].
• [The accused] shall  not have contact or 
communication with [the complainant] except 
to discuss major decisions affecting [the 
children] or to make arrangements regarding 
[the accused] exercising access to [the 
children].
About eight years later, the  accused entered the 
complainant’s residence to give their  son some 
money. When the complainant found him in her 
home, they argued and she  asked him to leave.  
After the accused left, the complainant contacted the 
police to report a breach of the prevention order and 
the accused was charged with two counts of 
breaching  a court order under s. 127 of the Criminal 
Code.
Manitoba Provincial Court
The complainant testified that the 
accused had entered her home before 
and she had told him many times that 
this “had to come to a stop”, but he 
would not listen to her. When the judge asked the 
self-represented accused during  closing  arguments 
whether he had a lawful excuse for breaching  the 
prevention order the accused described a history of 
acquiescence by the complainant in not seeking  to 
have the order enforced.  The accused said he had 
been going  to the complainant’s residence for six to 
eight years and that she had been allowing  him to 
breach the court order.  The trial judge found that 
“the previous eight year practice that may have 
developed” was a lawful excuse to the charges and 
found him not guilty. In his view, the complainant 
and the accused “had loosely interpreted” the order 
and made “tolerances” for what were technical 
breaches. The accused was acquitted.
Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench
The Crown unsuccessfully challanged the 
accused’s acquittals. The appeal judge 
relied on the accused’s submissions 
during  his closing  argument as evidence 
in the trial. Although the accused had breached the 
prevention order when he entered the residence of 
the complainant and had contact or communication 
with her, the appeal judge upheld the trial judge’s 
finding  that there was a “period of acquiescence”, 
which amounted to a  lawful excuse within the 
meaning  of s. 127. The Crown’s appeal was 
dismissed. 
Manitoba Court of Appeal
The Crown appealed again 
arguing  that the appeal judge 
misapprehended the evidence 
and erred in finding  the 
accused had a lawful excuse for breaching  the 
prevention order.
Misapprehension of the Evidence
The Court of Appeal concluded that the accused’s 
responses when questioned by the trial judge about 
the complainant not seeking  to have the order 
enforced on prior occasions which formed the basis 
of the lawful excuse for breaching  the prevention 
order was not evidence at the trial. “The information 
provided to the court by  the accused was not under 
oath, the Crown was not given an opportunity  to 
cross-examine  the accused on the information, and 
the information was not put to the  complainant, who 
had testified to the  contrary at the trial,” said Justice 
Lemaistre for the Court. “Further, the [appeal] judge 
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relied on the information in upholding  the trial 
judge’s finding  of a  lawful excuse.  In doing  so, he 
misapprehended the evidence.”
Lawful Excuse
The appeal judge also erred in finding  there was a 
lawful excuse for breaching the prevention order:
 
Section 127 of the Code makes it an offence to 
disobey a court order without a lawful 
excuse.  Once the Crown has proven the 
elements of an offence beyond a reasonable 
doubt, as was done in this case, the burden shifts 
to the accused to establish a lawful excuse on a 
balance of probabilities.  A lawful excuse 
operates to negate the mens rea of an offence 
which, in the case of a charge of breaching a 
court order, means that the accused did not 
intend the actions that led to the breach.  For the 
purposes of proof of an offence under section 
127, “it matters not whether it is a civil or 
criminal order that is being disobeyed”.
Whether the accused had a lawful excuse for 
breaching  the prevention order was therefore a 
fundamental question at the summary conviction 
appeal. Since there was no properly tendered 
evidence of a lawful excuse before the trial 
judge, the [appeal] judge’s conclusion that there 
was a l awfu l excuse was a ma te r ia l 
misapprehension of the evidence and cannot be 
allowed to stand. [references omitted, paras. 
12-13]
The Court of Appeal also commented on whether 
the order could be varied by the practice  of inaction 
on behalf of the complaint respecting  other 
breaches:
The [appeal] judge found that it is a “solid 
practical approach” to allow the parties to a 
prevention order to vary the order by their 
conduct and to “resort back to relying  upon the 
order” with notice.  It is contrary to the purpose 
of the Act, and what is known about domestic 
violence, to suggest that an order can be varied 
in this manner.   Pursuant to section 14(1) of the 
Act, a prevention order may only be made if the 
court finds that the person to be protected by the 
order has been stalked or subjected to domestic 
violence by the responding party.  Once the 
order has been made, served on the responding 
party, and filed in court, the order remains in 
effect until a judge is satisfied on application 
“that it is fit and just” (at section 19(1)) to vary or 
revoke the order. [refrences omitted, para. 14]
The Crown’s appeal was allowed, the accused was 
convicted on two counts of breaching  a court order 
and an absolute discharge was imposed.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
Editor’s note: Additional facts taken from R. v. 
Dilk, 2015 MBCA 111.
REFUSAL	ADMISSIBLE	DESPITE	
SUSPENSION	OF	s.10(b)	
CHARTER	RIGHT	
R. v. Caswell, 2015 ABCA 97
 
A police  officer stopped the accused’s 
truck after seeing  it travelling  a few 
kilometers over the speed limit and 
learning  it was registered to a  woman. 
The officer advised the accused that 
he had pulled him over to check for sobriety and 
documentation. Although the accused said he had 
been drinking, the officer noted that he covered his 
mouth when he  spoke, looked tired, was slurring  his 
BY THE BOOK:
Disobeying	Court	Order: Criminal Code
s. 127  (1)  Every one who, without lawful 
excuse, disobeys a lawful order made by a court 
of justice or by a person or body of persons 
authorized by any Act to make or give the 
order, other than an order for the payment of 
money, is, unless a punishment or other mode of proceeding 
is expressly provided by law, guilty of
(a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a 
term not exceeding two years; or
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction.
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speech slightly  and a had moderate smell of alcohol 
on his breath. The officer told the accused he 
suspected that he may be impaired. The officer 
radioed for another unit, which he knew was close 
by, to bring  an approved screening  device (ASD). He 
also asked the accused to accompany him to his 
police vehicle.
The officer told the accused to leave his cell phone 
in his truck, which he was holding  when he got out 
of it. The ASD arrived within two minutes and the 
officer requested an ASD sample. The accused 
replied that he would not blow into the ASD until he 
had spoken with his lawyer, and stated that he 
should be allowed to use his cell phone to call one. 
The officer explained the difference between an ASD 
and a breathalyzer and that the accused would have 
an opportunity to contact a lawyer before being 
asked for a breathalyzer sample at the police station. 
The accused continued to refuse to give an ASD 
sample and the officer continued to insist he could 
not have an opportunity to phone a lawyer until he 
complied with the ASD demand. After several 
minutes of “just going  in circles”, the officer arrested 
the accused for refusing  to give a breath sample. The 
accused was not taken to the police station but 
instead released from the scene on a promise to 
appear. His truck was towed and impounded 
pursuant to the provincial administrative scheme. He 
was charged with refusing  to provide a  breath 
sample. 
Alberta Provincial Court
The officer testified he did not allow the 
accused to use his cell phone to call a 
lawyer because he had been taught that 
detained persons are not allowed to 
contact a lawyer when faced with an ASD demand. 
He also said that it was his practice to tell drivers to 
leave their cell phone in their vehicle as it was easier 
to keep  track  of a detained person’s property if it 
remained in the person’s own vehicle.
The judge found the officer had no duty to allow the 
accused to contact a lawyer before providing  a 
roadside sample. While s 10(b) of the Charter 
guarantees the right to retain and instruct counsel 
without delay upon detention or arrest, the law was 
settled that s 10(b)  rights are suspended while a 
detained motorist is asked to participate in roadside 
sobriety screening  tests regardless of whether the 
right could be reasonably accommodated with the 
presence of a cell phone. This violation of s. 10(b) 
was justified as a reasonable limit under to s 1. 
 
The judge also found that allowing  the opportunity 
to consult a  lawyer prior to the test may lead to a 
breach of the  s. 254(2) Criminal Code requirement 
that the test be done “forthwith.” As well, it may not 
be possible  for police  officers to provide sufficient 
privacy at a roadside stop  to allow for reasonable 
consultation with counsel. Finally, even if there was 
a s. 10(b)  breach by denying  the accused’s request to 
call his lawyer on his cell phone, the evidence of his 
refusal to comply with the ASD demand was 
nonetheless admissible under s. 24(2) of the Charter. 
The officer was acting  in good faith, he  correctly 
understood the law and the refusal was real 
evidence essential to the Crown’s case. The accused 
was convicted of failing, without lawful excuse, to 
comply with the demand. 
Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench
The accused appealed the trial judge’s 
ruling  that his constitutional right to 
counsel had not been breached. The 
appeal judge found the right to counsel 
could be suspended for a roadside breath sample 
provided the test could be done forthwith. Cellular 
technology, she found, did not override  the 
continued overall purpose and justification for 
suspending  the right to counsel during  roadside 
sobriety investigations. The societal objective of 
facilitating  the detection and deterrence of impaired 
driving  along  with  practical operational realities 
continued to be relevant. In this case, a proper ASD 
demand was made forthwith and there was no 
reasonable excuse for failing  to comply  with it. The 
accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Alberta Court of Appeal
The accused again appealed 
arguing, in part, that the appeal 
judge erred in relying  on 
evidence of the refusal that was 
obtained while his rights were suspended. In his 
view, the evidence of the fact of his refusal to 
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comply should be inadmissible on a basis analogous 
to the position that a “fail” result on completion of 
ASD testing  should not be used as evidence for 
proof of impairment. But the Court of Appeal 
disagreed:
The [accused] calls the difference between a 
refusal and a failure on the test an “artificial 
distinction”. This argument is an apples and 
oranges situation. The use of a ‘fail’ result would 
be use of conscripted evidence about one set of 
facts to support an inference about the state or 
condition of the motorist. By comparison, the 
fact of refusal is the actus reus of the offence of 
refusal. The only conscription there emanates 
directly from the Code itself as a matter of law, 
absent … a Charter restriction on the law itself. 
There is no analogy and, therefore, no “artificial 
distinction”. [para. 8]
Nor did the Court of Appeal accept the accused’s 
additional argument that the “fact” of refusal should 
be treated in some manner as conditional or perhaps 
revocable by the individual until after the individual 
has consulted with counsel. “Parliament speaks of 
lawful excuses, not conditional deferments to run 
the clock perhaps in hope of a remittance of some 
blood alcohol concentration,” said Justice Watson. 
“Parliament enacted a demand, not an invitation to 
treat.” Although the accused told the officer he 
would not comply with the demand until after he 
spoken to counsel, the officer correctly told him he 
had to decide on his own. “If the [accused] made an 
error of judgment, it was an error of law on his part, 
not misconduct by the state,” said Justice Watson. 
The officer immediately release the accused on a 
promise to appear at the roadside. There was no 
need for the officer to convey him to the police 
station and allow him to speak to a  lawyer and then 
make his decision to offer samples.
The accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
INNER	COMPULSION	TO	
CONFESS	NOT	ATTRIBUTABLE	TO	
POLICE	CONDUCT
R. v. Fernandes, 2016 ONCA 772
The accused walked into a police 
station and told the front counter 
administrative assistant that he 
wanted to turn himself in for burning 
down his mother’s house. He was not 
under investigation, detention or arrest for any 
offence. A police officer was summoned and 
interviewed the accused. The accused said he was 
homeless and wanted to go to jail. The officer 
advised the accused that anything  he said could be 
used as evidence and recommended that he exercise 
his right to consult counsel. During  the interview, 
the officer told the accused three times that he was 
free to leave at any time, four times that anything  he 
said could be used as evidence against him and 10 
times that arson was a serious offence. On three 
occasions the officer mentioned that arson could 
result in a sentence of 14 years in prison. The officer 
also repeatedly asked the accused if he wanted to 
speak with a lawyer and that one could be provided 
free of charge. He refused the offer of counsel nine 
times but did call duty counsel the tenth time it was 
offered. Then, after speaking  to counsel, the accused 
provided a detailed confession about the arson in 
which he implicated himself. The accused was 
charged with arson. 
Ontario Superior Court
During  a voir dire on the voluntariness of 
the statement, the Crown called the 
police officers and staff who had contact 
with the accused at the police  station 
when he made his statement as well as the officers 
who initially investigated the fire. Although the 
judge found the interviewing  officer’s conduct was 
“unimpeachable” and “blameless” and the accused 
had an operating  mind when the statement was 
made, she  ruled that a combination of “oppressive 
conditions and inducement have operated together 
to produce an involuntary confession.” In her view, 
the officer had induced the accused to confess 
“Parliament speaks of lawful excuses, 
not conditional deferments to run the 
clock perhaps in hope of a remittance 
of some blood alcohol concentration.”
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through presenting  the quid pro quo of jail in return 
for a confession. The accused had been "oppressed" 
by his own "mind" and "imagination" because he 
was homeless and in desperate need of shelter. The 
judge stated:
This is one of those cases where oppressive 
conditions and inducement have operated 
together to produce an involuntary confession. 
Although it is usually the case that the focus is 
on police conduct when examining threats, 
promises or oppressive circumstances, this case 
illustrates how, even with unimpeachable police 
conduct, a confession may be found to be 
involuntary when all of the circumstances are 
examined . . . an accused may be labouring 
under circumstances of oppression sufficient to 
create a reasonable doubt that have nothing to 
do with the police.
The statement was ruled inadmissible and, without 
the statement, the Crown could no longer proceed 
to trial. An acquittal was entered. 
Ontario Court of Appeal
The Crown appealed the trial 
j u d g e ’ s r u l i n g  o n t h e 
voluntariness of the accused’s 
statement. In the Crown’s view, 
the judge misapplied the law concerning 
inducements and oppression and conflated 
voluntariness with reliability. 
Confessions Rule
Under the common law confessions rule, the Crown 
bears the onus of establishing, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that a statement made to a person in 
authority was voluntary. In determining  whether a 
statement was voluntary, a  court must consider 
inducements (threats or promises), oppression, the 
operating  mind requirement and police trickery. In 
this case, the judge found there was no police 
trickery and concluded the accused had an 
operating  mind. Thus, the  two factors requiring 
analysis were inducement and oppression.
Inducement
Justice Hourigan, speaking  for the Court of Appeal, 
described the inducement factor this way:
Where the state induces a suspect to confess, 
regardless of whether the inducement comes in 
the form of a threat or a promise, the confession 
will be inadmissible when the inducement, 
whether standing alone or in combination with 
other factors, is strong enough to raise a 
reasonable doubt about whether the will of the 
subject has been overborne.
The most important consideration in determining 
whether the accused's statement has been 
induced by such a threat or promise is whether 
there was a quid pro quo offer by the 
interrogators. A quid pro quo offer is an 
inducement for the suspect to confess that raises 
the possibility that the suspect is confessing, not 
“Where the state induces a suspect to confess, regardless of whether the inducement 
comes in the form of a threat or a promise, the confession will be inadmissible when the 
inducement, whether standing alone or in combination with other factors, is strong enough 
to raise a reasonable doubt about whether the will of the subject has been overborne.”
“The most important consideration in determining whether the accused's statement has 
been induced by such a threat or promise is whether there was a quid pro quo offer by 
the interrogators. A quid pro quo offer is an inducement for the suspect to confess that 
raises the possibility that the suspect is confessing, not because of any internal desire to 
confess, but merely in order to gain the benefit offered by the interrogator.” 
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because of any internal desire to confess, but 
merely in order to gain the benefit offered by the 
interrogator. [references omitted, paras. 26-27]
Here, however the trial judge erred in concluding 
the officer’s advisement that the accused could be 
imprisoned as a consequence of his confession, 
given his desire to find shelter, operated as an 
inducement:
• There was no nexus between the threat or 
promise and the confession. “There can be no 
inducement where  the thing  said or done by 
the person in authority does not result in the 
confession. There was no nexus in this case as 
the [accused] came to the police detachment 
with the express purpose of confessing  to the 
arson. He made his intentions known to the 
administrative assistant before speaking  to the 
officer.” 
• “The act of supplying  accurate factual 
information to an accused does not constitute 
an inducement.” The officer had a duty to 
provide information about the accused’s 
potential jeopardy  and, if he did not do so, the 
statement could potentially  be found to be 
involuntary on that basis. “Police officers 
should not be placed in an untenable position 
where  both providing  and failing  to provide 
suspects with information about their potential 
jeopardy could each render statements 
inadmissible.”
• “The officer was not actively seeking  to elicit a 
confession. To the contrary, he repeatedly 
advised the [accused] to seek counsel, told him 
he was free to leave at any time, and made 
clear the seriousness of the situation.”
Oppression
The Court of Appeal described the oppressive state 
conduct in relation to voluntariness as:
A statement of an accused will be rendered 
involuntary and inadmissible where the conduct 
of a police officer or the circumstances of the 
detention are so oppressive as to raise a doubt 
whether the accused was able to make an 
independent choice to speak to the police or 
remain silent.
Examples of oppressive conditions include 
situations where the detainee is deprived of 
food, clothing, sleep, or medical attention. 
Excessively aggressive, intimidating  questioning 
by the police for a prolonged period of time may 
also constitute oppression. 
Under the confessions rule, the oppressive 
conditions must be caused or created by the 
state. The concern underlying  this part of the rule 
is that state agents may abuse their authority 
over an accused to effectively negate the 
accused’s ability to make an independent 
decision to speak to the authorities. [references 
omitted, paras. 33-34, 36]
In this case, oppression was not a factor. The trial 
judge found that the accused had an operating  mind 
and that there was no police misconduct. The 
accused himself was responsible for making  his own 
decision to speak to police  and not exercise his right 
“A statement of an accused will be 
rendered involuntary and inadmissible 
where the conduct of a police officer or 
the circumstances of the detention are so 
oppressive as to raise a doubt whether 
the accused was able to make an 
independent choice to speak to the police 
or remain silent.”
“Under the confessions rule, the oppressive conditions must be caused or created by the 
state. The concern underlying this part of the rule is that state agents may abuse their 
authority over an accused to effectively negate the accused’s ability to make an 
independent decision to speak to the authorities.”
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to silence. Any inner compulsion to confess created 
by the accused’s own mind and imagination was not 
attributable to police conduct such that the 
confession would be rendered involuntary.
Voluntariness v. Reliability
Justice Hourigan agreed with the Crown that the trial 
judge conflated the confession’s voluntariness with 
its reliability. On the voir dire, the issue was the 
voluntariness of the accused’s statement and  thus its 
admissibility. Its reliability (truth or falsity)  was an 
issue for trial, where all of the evidence could be 
considered. 
The Crown’s appeal was allowed and a new trial was 
ordered.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
MANNER	OF	DETENTION	
RENDERED	IT	
ARBITRARY
R. v. Squires, 2016 NLCA 54
Police received an anonymous phone 
tip  in the early hours of the morning 
that a male in a “black jeep” near the 
Froude Avenue Community Centre in 
St. John’s Newfoundland had a 
firearm, possibly a shotgun or rifle. The first officer 
on scene saw a lone black  sport utility vehicle with a 
male occupant in the  parking  lot. He activated his 
vehicle’s emergency lights, exited the vehicle, drew 
his firearm and told the  male, whom he recognized 
as the accused from a  previous occasion, to put his 
hands out the window. The accused fully 
cooperated. When a second officer arrived a few 
minutes later, she also drew her gun and the 
accused was told to exit his vehicle and lie face 
down on the ground. He was handcuffed, placed in 
a police car, read his rights and caution, and was 
told the police were investigating  a weapons 
complaint. The accused admitted there was a 
shotgun in his vehicle.
The first officer, unaware of the accused’s statement 
that there was a gun in the vehicle, used a flashlight 
and looked through the tinted glass of the accused’s 
vehicle to determine if there  was anyone else and to 
ensure  officer safety. Not seeing  any other occupant, 
he looked again and saw the partially covered barrel 
of a  shotgun on the back seat. He opened the door, 
seized the gun and shotgun shells, and told the 
second officer to arrest the accused for unsafe 
handling  of a firearm. The accused was re-advised of 
his rights and cautioned, and then arrested for 
careless use of a firearm and breach of a weapons 
prohibition. The accused was charged with several 
firearms offences.
Newfoundland Provincial Court
The first officer testified that he  did not 
have grounds to arrest the accused prior 
to observing  the firearm but said he 
nonetheless searched the vehicle 
incident to the  arrest. The second officer claimed 
reasonable grounds for the arrest based on the 
original complaint that had been phoned in, the 
accused’s admission that there was a shotgun in the 
vehicle and the fact that the first officer had seen the 
firearm in the vehicle. It was clear, however, that the 
formal arrest made by the second officer had not 
occurred before the gun and shells were  actually 
observed and seized. 
The judge concluded that the accused’s rights under 
ss. 8  and 9 of the Charter had been breached. First, 
he found the reasonable suspicion standard 
justifying  an investigative  detention was not met. 
“[The first officer] had not formed a subjective belief 
in the truthfulness of the tip  he had received,” said 
the judge. “There was no objective evidence in 
support of that tip beyond the presence of a black 
vehicle at the community centre. By removing  the 
accused and handcuffing  and searching  him, from 
the vehicle, he arbitrarily detained the accused and 
violated his section 9 rights.” The search of the 
vehicle was also unreasonable. “By performing  a 
visual search of the vehicle by  examining  by 
flashlight through the tinted windows, he violated 
the section 8 rights as he was basing  his search as an 
incident of arrest and there had been no lawful 
arrest,” he said. The judge excluded the evidence of 
the shotgun and shells and the accused was 
acquitted.
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Newfoundland Court of Appeal
The Crown appealed the 
accused’s acquit tals 
arguing  the trial judge 
erred in f inding  an 
arbitrary  detention and in ruling  that the search of 
the vehicle was unreasonable. A five member Court 
of Appeal was empaneled to hear the Crown’s 
challenge of the trial judge’s rulings.
Investigative Detention
Chief Justice Green, authoring  the three member 
majority  judgment, found there  was sufficient 
grounds to justify an investigative detention:
Here, the officers acted on a tip that a man was 
in a black utility vehicle at the community 
centre with a shotgun or rifle. That was sufficient 
to justify investigating. In the absence of 
anything indicating worthlessness or substantial 
unreliability of the information received, the 
police are entitled to rely on such information 
for the purpose of investigating further. It is the 
duty of a police officer to investigate potential 
crimes and to ask questions of citizens in 
relation to that investigation. It is not necessary 
that the police must have a subjective belief in 
the accuracy of the information at the time of 
commencing an investigation or that, at these 
early stages, there need be any objective 
corroboration of the information suggesting  the 
need for investigation. 
That said, the right and duty to investigate does 
not automatically imply a right to detain or use 
force short of arrest. The degree of detention that 
is justifiable in pursuance of the investigation 
will depend, on a view of the totality of 
circumstances, on what is reasonably necessary 
to facilitate that investigation. At that point, the 
officer must have reasonable grounds to suspect 
that in all the circumstances the targeted person 
“is connected to a particular crime and that such 
detention is necessary”.
Upon arrival at the scene, the first officer 
observed a man in a vehicle that roughly fit the 
description given in the tip. No one else fitting 
the description was present. Given the possible 
presence of a firearm, it was perfectly reasonable 
for the officer to suspect that [the accused] was 
connected with the alleged crime and to seek to 
detain him to investigate further.  The safety of 
the public and the investigating officers was 
potentially engaged. [references omitted, paras. 
18-20]
Although the detention was justified, the majority 
found the manner in which it was effected rendered 
it arbitrary:
However, in the absence of any indication of 
at tempted f l ight, uncooperativeness or 
threatening behavior, that could have been 
accomplished by requiring  the [accused] to exit 
the vehicle and to place his hands in plain sight 
on the top of the vehicle, preparatory to a pat 
down search. It did not in the circumstances 
require ordering him to the ground at gunpoint, 
handcuffing him and placing him in the police 
cruiser before continuing  to look for any 
weapons.  What began as a lawful detention 
became unlawful when excessive force and 
unnecessary detention methods were employed.  
The detention became arbitrary and was 
therefore a breach of section 9 of the Charter. 
[para. 36]
“What began as a lawful detention became 
unlawful when excessive force and 
unnecessary detention methods were 
employed.  The detention became 
arbitrary and was therefore a breach of 
section 9 of the Charter. “
“[T]he right and duty to investigate does not automatically imply a right to detain or use 
force short of arrest. The degree of detention that is justifiable in pursuance of the 
investigation will depend, on a view of the totality of circumstances, on what is reasonably 
necessary to facilitate that investigation.” 
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Unreasonable Search?
The search of the vehicle could not be  justified as a 
search incident to investigative detention because at 
the time of the search the detention became 
unlawful. However, it was a lawful search incident 
to arrest because at the time of the search, the police 
had reasonable grounds to arrest the accused before 
the search was conducted. These grounds included 
the presence of the shotgun which the officer saw 
when he looked through the tinted window using  his 
flashlight. Unlike the trial judge, the majority  found 
looking  through the window with the aid of a 
flashlight did not constitute a search for Charter 
purposes:
To constitute a search within section 8, the 
actions of the police must have intruded on a 
reasonable expectation of privacy. While it is 
true that whether a reasonable expectation of 
privacy exists is said to depend upon “the totality 
of the circumstances” and the fact that the 
subject matter being  observed or seized is in 
public view is but one factor among many to be 
considered in the privacy expectation analysis, 
the situation is different if all that is occurring is 
visual observation, without more, from outside 
the territorial zone of privacy that is involved 
and when what is engaged is not an issue 
involving  personal or informational, as opposed 
to territorial, privacy.  …
This surely makes sense when what is involved is 
simple observation in circumstances where only 
territorial privacy is engaged. We rightly expect 
more of our police forces when conducting  an 
investigation than for them to wander aimlessly 
about their business in the hopes they will 
stumble upon something  relevant. We expect 
them to be purposeful, focused and methodical 
in what they do. One of their chief tools in 
carrying out an investigation is their powers of 
observation. If they can exercise their powers of 
observation productively without physically 
invading any private space in which the owner 
or occupier has a reasonable expectation of 
territorial privacy and without invading 
informational and personal privacy, the person 
who has not taken the trouble to conceal the 
item observed can hardly complain. To restrict 
the police from looking or, if they have already 
looked, to effectively  pretend that what they 
saw did not exist, would unreasonably, 
unnecessarily and arbitrarily hamper them in 
effectively doing their duty. It must be 
remembered that a police officer needs no legal 
authority to approach or speak to a person sitting 
in a vehicle in a public space like a parking lot. 
In making such an approach the officer does not 
have to avert his or her eyes from looking in the 
vehicle and observing items in plain sight.
Nor does the fact that the officer was aided in 
his observation by the use of a flashlight through 
tinted glass make any difference. …
Accordingly, observing  portions of the shotgun 
sufficient to identify it as a shotgun, in plain 
Charges the accused faced:
• careless handling or storage of a firearm (section 86(1) 
of the Criminal Code);
• unauthorized possession of a prohibited or restricted 
weapon (section 92(2) of the Code);
• unauthorized possession of a prohibited or restricted 
firearm with readily accessible ammunition (section 
95(1) of the Code);
• possession of a firearm while prohibited (section 
117.01 of the Code);
•  unauthorized possession of a prohibited or restricted 
weapon (section 91(2) of the Code);
• unlawful possession of a firearm in a motor vehicle 
(section 94(1) of the Code); and
• possession of a firearm with an altered, defaced or 
removed serial number (section 108(1)(b) of the 
Code).
“It must be remembered that a police officer needs no legal authority to approach or 
speak to a person sitting in a vehicle in a public space like a parking lot. In making such an 
approach the officer does not have to avert his or her eyes from looking in the vehicle 
and observing items in plain sight. Nor does the fact that the officer was aided in his 
observation by the use of a flashlight through tinted glass make any difference.”
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view on the backseat of the vehicle, did not 
amount to a search. The trial judge erred in 
concluding otherwise. [references omitted, 
paras. 52-55]
Thus, the search of the vehicle only commenced 
when the officer opened the door, not when he 
looked in the window and saw the gun. But opening 
the door and searching  the vehicle was justified as a 
search incident to arrest. “Upon observing  the 
shotgun through the window, that information, 
coupled with the information which initiated the 
attendance of the officers at the scene, and the 
admission by [the accused] that he had a gun in his 
possession, constituted reasonable and probable 
grounds for arrest,” said Chief Justice Green. “The 
subjective and objective components of the  test 
were satisfied. Inasmuch as the observation of the 
gun on the backseat of the vehicle did not… amount 
to a search in itself, this is not a case of attempting  to 
use the results of the search to constitute  the grounds 
for arrest. Furthermore, once the items were seized, 
the arrest followed immediately thereafter. The 
seizure was therefore incident to the arrest. It can 
therefore be justified on that basis.” 
Plain View
The majority also concluded that the seizure of the 
gun was also authorized by the plain view doctrine:
The plain view doctrine allows for a seizure 
without warrant where the item being  seized is 
in plain sight of the person effecting the seizure 
and the item is potentially related to the matter 
being investigated. An object to which the plain 
view doctrine applies can be seized without 
breach of section 8 rights.
In this jurisdiction, the application of the 
doctrine has been expressed to be dependent on 
the existence of three requirements: (i) the officer 
must be lawfully in a position from which the 
evidence was plainly in view; (ii) discovery of 
the evidence must be inadvertent; and (iii) it 
must be apparent to the officer at the time that 
the observed item may be evidence of a crime or 
otherwise subject to seizure. [references omitted, 
paras. 65-66] 
Chief Justice Green concluded that the firearm was 
discovered inadvertently, however, even if it wasn’t, 
he opined that inadvertent discovery was not an 
absolute requirement for the operation of the  plain 
view doctrine:
In this case, given the absence of unanimity on 
the issue across the country, the absence of any 
definitive statement or analysis on the issue by 
the Supreme Court of Canada, the possible 
misunderstanding of the United States 
jurisprudence which formed the basis of earlier 
Canadian decisions, the fact that the rationale 
for the plain view doctrine (based on the 
absence of any interference with a reasonable 
expectation of privacy) does not support an 
inadvertence requirement, and the fact that the 
rule in this case does not involve upsetting 
settled police expectations and it is not a rule 
upon which an accused would rely, I am 
satisfied that the requirements for the 
establishment of the plain view doctrine should 
not include inadvertent discovery. So long as the 
police are lawfully in a place from where the 
“The plain view doctrine allows for a seizure without warrant where the item being seized 
is in plain sight of the person effecting the seizure and the item is potentially related to 
the matter being investigated. An object to which the plain view doctrine applies can be 
seized without breach of section 8 rights.”
“[T]he requirements for the establishment of the plain view doctrine should not include 
inadvertent discovery. So long as the police are lawfully in a place from where the viewing 
can take place without invading the suspect’s zone of territorial privacy and the item is in 
plain view, it may be seized without a warrant.”
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viewing can take place without invading the 
suspect’s zone of territorial privacy and the item 
is in plain view, it may be seized without a 
warrant. While the fact that discovery is 
inadvertent may reinforce the genuineness of 
police assertions supporting  plain view, it need 
not be a stand-alone requirement. [para. 78]
s. 24(2) Admissibility
Even though the seizure of the gun did not breach s. 
8  of the Charter, the s. 9 breach resulting  from the 
use of excessive  force during  the detention required 
a s. 24(2) analysis. The majority, however, would 
have admitted the  evidence. The Crown’s appeal was 
allowed and a new trial was ordered.
A Concurring Opinion
Justice Rowe, authoring 
his own opinion, agreed 
with the majority that “a 
police officer standing  in 
a public place and looking  through 
the window of a vehicle is not 
conducting  a  ‘search’ within the 
meaning  of section 8  of the  Charter.” 
He also agreed that “where a police 
officer has grounds to make an arrest 
and where as part of a single 
transaction the officer first conducts 
a search and seizure and then carries 
out the arrest, the  search and seizure 
can properly be viewed as incidental 
to the arrest.” However, he did not 
rely on the  plain view doctrine in his 
analysis and would not extend its scope as the 
majority did. Justice Rowe concurred with the 
majority in allowing  the Crown’s appeal, admitting 
the evidence under s. 24(2) and ordering a new trial. 
A Different View
Justice Welsh concluded that police not 
only  used excessive force against the 
accused but also conducted a de facto 
arrest when he was ordered to lie face 
down on the ground, handcuffed and placed in the 
rear of the police car. This was performed in the 
absence  of the required subjective belief to ground 
the arrest. The de facto arrest was thus unlawful and 
amounted to an arbitrary detention:
While the nature of the information relayed to 
the officers involving the presence of a gun 
dictated the exercise of heightened care, there 
was no indication from the anonymous call to 
the communications centre that [the accused] 
was using a gun or acting in a threatening 
manner. [The accused] immediately complied 
with the first officer’s commands. He put his 
hands out the window in full view and got out of 
the car as directed by the officer. It would be 
expected that an officer in this situation would 
have directed [the accused] to place his hands 
on top of the car for the purpose of ensuring  that 
his hands remained visible and to allow the 
officer to conduct a pat-down search to 
determine whether he was 
carrying a weapon.  This would 
also provide the officer with an 
o p p o r t u n i t y t o t e l l t h e 
individual the reason for his 
d e t e n t i o n . … I n t h e 
circumstances of this case, to 
require [the accused] to lie face 
down on the ground, and to 
handcuff him would amount to 
excessive force and an arbitrary 
detention as well as a de facto 
arrest in breach of section 9 of 
the Charter. [para. 128]
The search of the vehicle 
incident to this unlawful arrest 
was therefore unreasonable. 
Justice Welsh would have upheld 
the trial judge’s decision in excluding  the  evidence 
and dismiss the Crown appeal.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
“Where a police officer 
has grounds to make an 
arrest and where as part 
of a single transaction the 
officer first conducts a 
search and seizure and 
then carries out the 
arrest, the search and 
seizure can properly be 
viewed as incidental to the 
arrest.”
Note-able Quote
“One of the most important keys to success is 
having  the discipline to do what you know you 
should do, even when you don’t feel like doing 
it.” - Unknown
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ILLICIT	DRUG	OVERDOSES	IN	BC
The British Columbia Coroners Service recently 
released statistics for overdose deaths occurring  in its 
province from January 1 to September 30, 2016.
The number of apparent drug  overdose 
deaths from January-September 2016.
The number of deaths involving  males, 
which accounted for 80% of all deaths.
The number of deaths involving females.
The Fraser Health Authority had the 
most illicit drug overdose deaths. 
The age group accounting  for 
the largest percentage of illicit 
drug overdose deaths.
The proportion of illicit drug 
overdose deaths from January  to 
August 2016  for which fentanyl 
was detected. 
Source: Illicit Drug  Overdose Deaths in BC - January 1, 2007 
- September 30, 2016. Ministry of Justice, Office of the Chief 
Coroner. October 19, 2016
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